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Abstract This study explores the relationship between violence and power through
examining the archival documents about the outlaws in the Ottoman Empire from
1852 to 1876. I argue that the outlaws and the use of violence in the public sphere de-
fied the power of the Ottoman Empire. Thereof, the present study agrees with the main
thesis of Hannah Arendt about the destructive influence of violence on power. How-
ever, I take Hannah Arendt’s argument on violence one step further by claiming that
the form of violence -whether political or non-political- loses its significance when both
public safety and state sovereignty are under great threats at the same time in the
zones of fragility.
*****
Introduction: Rethinking Outlaws through Violence and Power
Violence in political and social life created formidable challenges
both for the victimised subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the
governing cadre of the state. These challenges fanned the flames of
political tensions when some of the revolts rendered the central state
power significantly impotent as it happened in the Ottoman Empire.
The outlaws used political violence to target the state authorities to
get their independence with the rise of nationalism in the long
nineteenth century. On the other hand, there were also outlaws
who victimised local people through using non-political violence
without distinguishing their ethnic or religious identities. The
amalgamation of nationalist sentiments and the power of religious
authorities over the local communities aggravated political risks for
the Sublime Porte1 -the Porte hereafter- to control its diverse terri-
tories nobly and deftly from the imperial centre in Istanbul. Follow-
ing the dreadful developments in the nineteenth century, the
attacks of outlaws, the prevalence of violence, and finally religious
and national concerns found a common sphere to defy the authority
of the Porte. As a result, the increasing number of files and reports
that were exchanged between the local administrative regions and
the Porte shaped the multifaceted relationship between the centre
and the periphery through the dynamics of violence and power.
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Yet it still remains an enigma when we question how the forms of
violence and its influence on power create discontents both among
the state and non-state forces. This is the reason that the present
study aims to clarify this relationship between violence and power
through analysing archival sources related to the outlaws in the
Ottoman Empire. Centralising outlaws in this study while exploring
the relationship between violence and power aims to open new gates
to clarify the bewildering role of violence both in the social and
political life. I will analyse a number of archival documents that I
derived from the Ottoman Archives located in Başbakanlık Osmanlı
Arşivleri (BOA), Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, Istanbul. I
particularly consulted the Fonds of Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Belgeleri
(Documents of Grand Vizier’s Offıce), Girid İrâdeleri (Cretan Decrees),
Sadâret Âmedî Kalemi Defterleri (Registers of Amedi Office), Irade-
Hariciye (Imperial Decrees on Foreign Affairs), Hariciye Nezareti
Belgeleri Siyasi (Ottoman Foreign Ministry Political Section Docu-
ments), Taşra Bosna Müfettişliği Evrâkı (Documents of Provincial
Inspection of Bosnia), Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Meclis-i Vala Evrakı
(Documents of Grand Vizier’s Offıce related to the Legislative and
Supreme Council), and finally Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Nezâret ve
Devâir Evraki (Documents of Grand Vizier’s Office about Correspon-
dence between Ministries and Offices). The present study is geo-
graphically limited to the Balkan region and Crete. These territories
included numerous ethnic and religious communities so it offers a
dynamic and diverse character to explore the relationship between
violence and power. I also analysed the archival documents from
the second half of the nineteenth century to the declaration of the
first Ottoman constitution in 1876. The violence and its relationship
with outlaws conflated in a more durable, politicized and resilient
path starting from 1876 to the fall of the Ottoman Empire through
secret committees and neatly organised attacks. Thereof, the illumi-
nation of the period before 1876 will open new ways in our thinking
to understand the role of political and non-political violence. This is
another reason that I analyse the archival sources in two main
categories, which are “the zones of political fragility” and “the zones
of social fragility”. The political violence of outlaws was the ruling
power in the particular areas of the Ottoman Empire so I presented
this particularity through the zones of political fragility. In this
context, the zones of political fragility signify particular areas where
the violent conflict between the outlaws and the state authority
surges because of political discontents such as ethnic, religious,
and cultural concerns. Inversely, the non-political violence was also
used by the outlaws so it created particular areas in which social
conditions aggravated dramatically. I presented this particularity
through the zones of social fragility. The zones of social fragility
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indicates particular areas where the violent conflict between the out-
laws and the state authority surges because of non-political violence,
which increases the numbers of victims dramatically.
I raise two main arguments in this study. I argue that the relation-
ship between violence and power in contentious societies are twofold.
First, it can either revolve around the political or non-political
concerns of certain communities. Second, violence in the public
sphere is a destructive and ultimate force so much so that its politi-
cal and non-political character can have the very similar influence on
the dominant ruling power. My second argument hinges on the zones
of fragility concept to define the relationship between violence and
power. The employment of violence in the public space created the
zones of fragility in which both the Ottoman state authority and the
victims of violence emerged as vulnerable agencies when the outlaws
and sometimes the state forces terrorised these zones. The political
fragility comes to the fore with the increase of political conflict and
the deployment of political violence. As a result, political violence in
the public spaces creates the zones of political fragility. On the other
hand, the non-political violence exacerbates the public safety in the
zones of social fragility when the non-political violence rules the ev-
eryday life through the attacks of outlaws against the civilians. The
remainder of the present article is organised into three sections.
The first section deals with the historical background and the
theoretical intervention concerning violence, power and outlaws
through using mainly the insights and arguments of Hannah Arendt
on violence. The second section examines the role of political violence
in the zones of political fragility. The third section explores the role of
non-political violence through the risk posed against public safety in
the zones of social fragility. Finally, the conclusion part sums up the
relationship between violence and power through the inclusiveness
of the zones of fragility.
The Historical Background of Outlaws and the Theoretical
Expansion of Violence-Power Nexus
Banditry is one of the most studied concepts in historical and politi-
cal sociology. The fluid characters of outlaws make them significant
figures both for the state and the marginalised segments of society.
Eric Hobsbawm’s social bandit theory was highly influential in differ-
ent disciplines. However, it received critiques as well because the
bandits remained highly controversial social agencies so it was hard
to draw huge conclusions by limiting them into a narrowed theoreti-
cal boundary.2 What is more, an outlaw had a complex dynamic
character in the Ottoman Empire. Şaki -eşkiya in plural- is the key
word that was used by the Ottoman authorities to indicate the
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outlaws. Şaki etymologically signifies a desperate or miserable per-
son; however, it gained a more negative connotation since it was
mostly used for bandits and brigands who violated the rules of state
authority and created dissent both in the peripheries and the
governing centres. In addition to şaki, klephts demonstrated a
traditional banditry character in the rural and mountainous areas
of Ottoman Greece. “The klephts became a serious social problem
even after Greece gained its full independence from the Ottoman
Empire in 1829. The klephts were mainly fugitives, debtors, outlaws,
misfits, adventurers, victims of oppression, men not attached to the
land by property or other obligations, who took to the hills and
became brigands.”3 A significant number of thefts and raids of the
klephts fostered discontentment in the Kingdom of Greece as well.4
“Similar to the klepths, haiduks were also used as popular aspira-
tions to point out the bandits both in the Ottoman Empire and
Eastern Europe.5 These multi-layered facets of outlaws made them
a part of multidimensional and hard social problem. As a result, şaki,
hajduk or klephts were the formidable figures of rural community
that was connected to the certain social and political notions such
as social injustice, public uncertainty, social isolation, political aims
and the vacuum of authority from time to time. Unsurprisingly,
power and violence are the key concepts both to understand the
outlaws and the reaction of state.
The Ottoman Empire had to recognise the perilous power of
outlaws in the periphery first time through Celali revolts in the
sixteenth century that posed significant risks to the state authority.6
The influence of outlaws reached a similar climax in the nineteenth
century when the Ottoman Empire was challenged utterly both from
the internal conflicts inside its own territories and the external
pressure in the war arenas. The extensive reforms during the reign
of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) brought important changes in
the administrative, fiscal and military area.7 Indeed, this prudent
and challenging era was the harbinger of a more organised and
centralised reform period. The declaration of a binding document
addressing the concerns of diverse communities of the Ottoman
Empire, even including the Sultan himself, was inevitable in the first
half of the nineteenth century to ameliorate the social and political
decadence. The declaration of the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 was
followed by a number of remarkable reform packages including the
Imperıal Rescript of 1856,8 and finally reached its peak in 1876 with
the announcement of the first Ottoman constitution. All these flawed
but strenuous struggles to keep the Empire united and to surge its
power again were marked by some of the fundamental values of
equality and justice that resonated through numerous reforms in
the nineteenth century. This transformation in the social, political,
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administrative, legal and intellectual sphere, as a result, ushered a
new phase in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, this tense era
was not only consisted of state reforms because nationalism and
the struggles among different ethnic communities opened new ways
of uprising against the Ottoman Empire to create an independent
political entity. All these reform struggles in this era were eventually
called Tanzimat, in other words reorganisation. The Edict of 1839
and the Edict of 1856 were indisputably avant-garde and promising
documents for both the Ottoman subjects and the state apparatus.
This new political sagacity included rational dimensions to establish
the rule of law and social justice by making significant, if not radical,
changes in social life, legal rights, cultural institutions, public regu-
lations and economic governance.9
Yet the gap between the ethical principles of Tanzimat and its ap-
plications in the vast lands of the Empire was devastatingly evident10
that partially gave a strong foothold to the revolts, resistance and
finally dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The disputes between
the local governance and the local community made discernible that
the central government was ineffective to coordinate the reforms
harmoniously in the periphery. The revolts in Niš (1841) and Vidin
(1850) were the alarming signals of the gaps between the centre
and periphery.11 The social injustice was the dominating reason of
these two uprisings. However, the political character of numerous
violent revolts was alarming particularly after the second half of the
nineteenth century. The Cretan revolts in the second half of the
1860s, the insurgency in Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1875 and
the April Uprising12 in 1876 gained an international attention on
the struggle of different ethnic communities to gain independence
from the Ottoman Empire. The violence was employed both by the
state authority and the outlaws at different degrees during these
revolts and uprisings. In this context, violence and power dynamics
of bandit-state-society nexus pose significant questions to unveil
the multiple paradigms of a contentious society.
Hannah Arendt produced prominent works to uncover the role
violence in polity. The perspectives of Hannah Arendt on violence
take its point of departure from a critical reading of the arguments
raised by Sorel, Fanon, Weber, Marx and Sartre about violence and
power.13 Arendt presented numerous cases from the contemporary
social and political issues to clarify her original concepts and defini-
tions. In doing so, Arendt produced one of the most significant and
yet debatable texts about the role of violence in the political realm.
The violence concept of Arendt includes some subversive dynamics
particularly about the outcome of violent action. She says that “the
distinction between violent and non-violent action is that the former
is exclusively bent upon the destruction of the old and the latter
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chiefly concerned with the establishment of something new.”14
Unsurprisingly, her critiques concerning the violence hinge on the
destructive force of violence. This destruction resonates not only in
the formidable ruling centres of the Powerful but also it shapes the
entire public sphere where the violent action is performed. This is
the reason that Arendt connected violence and power so neatly that
both of the concepts disguised in different forms and influenced each
other. Yet the character of violence has a more determining role over
the future of power while remaining the most deliberate reverbera-
tion of power at the same time.15 Thereof, Arendt draws attention
to the broad consensus when the issue is the impact of violence as
the most revealed constituent of power. She claims that “if we turn
to the literature on the phenomenon of power, we soon find out that
there exists an agreement among political theorists from Left to Right
that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of
power.”16
The violence-producing agencies need to burden the risk of being
suppressed by the repressive political authorities and they wipe out
in time.17 Arendt is righteous that the rule of violence may have
tragic outcomes and erode the power itself. However, it is equally
important to consider the perpetuators of violence as well. Arendt
noted that “in domestic affairs, violence functions indeed as the last
resort of power against criminals or rebels—that is, against individ-
uals who, as it were, refuse to be overpowered by the consensus of
the majority.”18 The use of violence and the impotence of state force
to prevent the attacks of outlaws against local people may delegiti-
mize state authority in the periphery. The weakened state authority
in the eyes of local people may also diminish the central power and
enforce it to use more violence to restore its defied authority. From
this point of view, we need to go one step further from the Arendt’s
perspective on violence to clarify the perplexing relationship between
violence and power because the actor, who uses violence, is as
important as the outcome of violence. The outlaws, therefore, are
located somewhere between the illegitimate actors of the ruling
political realm and violence-producing actors of everyday life. The
form of this violence depends on the goals of perpetuators. The polit-
ical violence can create great concerns for the state power as it may
lose its ultimate power temporarily or permanently. However, the
non-political violence in the public sphere -for instance the attacks
of outlaws to get material benefits- may also create great dissents
for the state authority when this violence is directed against the
innocent people. The persistence of these attacks against the civil-
ians, who are under the protection of state authority, demonstrates
that the state is not able to guarantee the public safety at all times.
As a result, both the political and non-political violence in the public
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sphere create a fragile political authority in the centre of ruling power
and a detrimental public life in the periphery of vulnerable social
geographies respectively. Hence, the two forms of violence, either
political or non-political, are equally perilous considering the rela-
tionship between the political and social actors. More importantly,
the proliferation of violence increases fragility in the realms of polity
and society.
The attacks of outlaws and the employment of violence in each
incident in a particular space make that area a zone of fragility. It
bears emphasis that the use of violence is a collective violence when
the issue is outlaws. Charles Tilly argued in his landmark study that
collective violence “is not simply individual aggression writ large.
Social ties, structures and processes significantly affect its charac-
ter.”19 The two zones of fragility, which are explored below through
diverse cases, aim to clarify this perplexing relationship between
violence and power. Centralizing outlaws to explore the complex
dynamics of polity and society offers us new perspectives about the
influence of different violence forms in the zones of fragility. This
fragility takes its focal strength from the increasing number of
victims and the state of vulnerability in the place of incident. The
outlaws, who have a specific political concern, use political violence
for the political determination and they resist against the dominant
political authority, which is either a local or central state force. A
political concern is not only related to the political issues. I use polit-
ical concern as an inclusive term that includes the concerns about
identity and justice so a political concern leads to a change or trans-
formation in the ruling political power. The challenge against the
ruling power fosters political conflict and broadens the scope of
political fragility. Therefore, the political conflict aggravates public
turmoil in the zones of political fragility. On the other hand, the
attacks against the civilian people to extort them, seize their goods,
and reap the benefits of organised raids create great dissents in the
social life. These attacks have no political purpose. However, each
attack creates the zones of social fragility with the diminishing public
safety in the everyday life. Thus, these attacks are marked as the
outcomes of non-political violence. What is more, the lack of suffi-
cient state support to get protected against the outlaws defy the
power of state authority in the eyes of local people in the periphery.
Following the surge of political and non-political violence, the state
power weakens both in the zones of social and political fragility
because the political violence directly targets the state authority for
their political concerns. Additionally, the non-political violence
renders the legitimacy of state authority vulnerable when the state
forces are not able to guarantee the public safety. The application
of violence and the political conflict make the zones of political
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fragility more formidable. As a result, the outlaws in the zones of
political fragility have certain politically oriented concerns, which
constitute an important part of their identities while resisting against
the state authority or its accomplices. However, the outlaws in the
zones of social fragility are not primarily resorted to violence because
of their politically oriented concerns. Conversely, the principal aim of
outlaws in the zones of social fragility is to survive through theft,
extortion or organising attacks to get material benefits so the identity
of victim has not a significant impact on the decision to commit
ordinary crimes.
The Zones of Political Fragility in the Prevalence of Political
Violence
The Greek War of Independence, (1821-1829), brought indepen-
dence to the majority of Greek communities that made the Greeks
the first Balkan nation on the path of independence struggle against
the Ottoman rule. Eventually, the Greek independence became a role
model for the other Balkan nations of the Ottoman Empire.20 Follow-
ing the independence of Greece, different ethnic communities in the
Ottoman Balkans strove to get independence from the Ottoman
Empire during the nineteenth century. The religious concerns
among the local religious authorities (particularly the influence of
Orthodox Christianity) conflated with the ethnic concerns (domi-
nantly pro-Slavic influence with the support of the Russian Empire).
This formidable combination crystallised political dissents of the
different communities in the Ottoman Empire. However, it is hard
to claim that every uprising attempt contained only a nationalist
character. Some uprisings, as it happened in the case of Niš (1841)
and Vidin (1850) revolts, were consisted of both the fabrics of social
injustice that were later fortified with the political dissents of the
rebels. The Ottoman Empire was more reactionary when the direct
target of outlaws was its political authority during these revolts. On
the other hand, the Porte was more flexible to negotiate with the
dissident communities about their social issues unless it posed a
serious political challenge against the Ottoman rule. The sensitivity
of the Porte against the political dissents created a fragile political
context in which power competition between outlaws and the state
authority created its own climax of violence. The documents, which
are examined below, show that the Porte defined each actor of politi-
cal uprising as an outlaw and marked each incident as a typical
banditry or brigandage activity. The deep tensions in the political
realm constituted violence as a highly valuable instrument both for
the uprising communities and the state authority while each agency
was striving to realise their own ideals. The commonality of using
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violence for the antagonist forces rendered the political situation
more fragile. The zones of political fragility, therefore, were the places
where the political concerns of the uprising communities and the
inclination of outlaws to use violence fostered the Ottoman state
power to respond violently while suppressing these attacks and
revolts.
One of the first significant initiatives was led by the ruling
members of the House of Petrović-Njegoš of Montenegro and their
soldiers in 1852 when they seized Žabljak castle. The Ottoman rule
portrayed many of these attacks equivalent to the malevolent acts
of outlaws. The Porte considered this intrusion of the Montenegrins
as a typical banditry activity and a direct violation of social order
and public safety. Hence, it was reported that the necessary steps
must have been taken accordingly to hinder these harrowing
attacks.21 For this aim, the Porte employed Ömer Lutfi Pasha and
surrounded Montenegro and Dalmatia from sea to break the siege
of the Principality of Montenegro. The Porte took this difficult
decision after receiving the letter from the local governors uttering
that the increasing number of assailment of Montenegro was a
perilous threat:
“We turned a blind eye to the banditry activities of Montenegrin rebels in the region
heretofore. However, the invasion of towns and villages of the Ottoman Empire by
Montenegro signifies a direct declaration of war against the Empire. The current
situation is unacceptable under any condition, and that may defy dignity of the state
while eventually resulting with the international independence of Montenegro”.22
This letter verified the concerns of Osman Mazhar Pasha, who was
Mutasarrif23 of Shkodër at that time. The burden of the Porte turned
to be more profound while the rumours regarding the independence
of Montenegro were spreading out from one village to another in the
region in the wake of these attacks.24
The early 1850s witnessed increasing resisting attempts of the
Montenegrin and Serbian Ruling Houses. The reaction of the Porte
against the collaboration of its subjects to rebel against its own
authority was factionist, if not fundamentalist. Accordingly, the Porte
framed these revolting places with particular phrases. For examples,
Zupa, Şuma, Benan, Grahova, Piva and Derbenak were the small
towns, which were notoriously called as “Nevâhî-i Âsîyye” -forbidden
rebellions- by the Porte.25 Bulgarians and Serbians constituted a
considerable number of population in these resisting zones. Their
religious and ethnic identity enmeshed with the encouragement to
widen public disorder in these towns led by the authoritarian Prince
of Montenegro, Danilo I who strenuously fought against the Ottoman
Empire in the 1850s for the independence of Montenegro and its
international recognition. The banditry activities in “Nevâhî-i Âsîyye”
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and in the border towns close to Montenegro became infamous at the
Porte when the assets and properties of the Muslim population were
plundered in this region. Particularly, the Muslim residents of
Çerniçe were part of these victims who lost their properties and their
concerns about the public safety aggravated severely.26 These rebel-
lious attempts of the outlaws, therefore, spurred different ethnic sub-
jects, particularly non-Muslims, to resist against the Ottoman rule.
Following the resistance of “Nevâhî-i Âsîyye”, the Porte was in-
formed that Serbian outlaws distributed numerous weapons to the
Christians. This kind of logistic support was a challenging attempt
for the preparation of a new rebellion against the Ottoman authority.
A sensitive balance needed to determine the route of social control.
For this purpose, the public reaction of local people was taken seri-
ously by the Porte. This was not an easy task when we considered
the inherently frightening legacy of the Ottoman Empire through
its corrupt local officials and suppression of the rebels in the periph-
ery. A document dated on December 1, 1861 dictated the collection
of the distributed weapons; however, the same document accentu-
ated the importance of prevention provocative behaviours against
the Christian subjects because such a provocation would have
yielded to commotion while gathering those weapons from them.27
The national awakening resonated not only in coffee houses and
the streets of volatile Balkan towns. Numerous churches and
monasteries were frontiers of this struggle. The priests and other
religious authorities played a major role to encourage and support
outlaws that contributed to the independence movement of
Christian ethnic groups and defiance of the Ottoman rule. The
Muslims became open targets because of the combination of national
and religious sentiments that fostered these attacks against them.
The violence was not only an instrument in the hands of outlaws.
The Ottoman local governance also used violence as an instrument
to control the region and suppress the revolts. The religious and
cultural clash appeared deeply and strainably after the mid-1850s
when the cultural and religious division was aggravating in the entire
Balkans. The tiny towns of Bosnia were part of this ferocious
division. The records and proceedings of the assembly of Nakşi, a
province of Mostar, delineated this fact through the discourse of their
complaints. Their grievances marked the grim realities of the social
context when they remained in a state of constant vulnerability to
violence and aggression of the Christian outlaws of Montenegro.28
On the other hand, the Muslims were not only victims of ongoing
political conflict. The Christians suffered horrendously due to asym-
metric warfare, political clashes, socially chaotic atmosphere and
mobilisation of the Ottoman military force to prevent the resistance.
This duality of violence in the periphery was not always under the
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control of the Porte that became clear when the Muslim armed
groups violated the order of the Porte and united with certain
zaptiehs29 in Volos, a port town in Thessaly, and let the fire of vio-
lence and oppression over the Christian subjects.30
The foreign intervention and logistic support offered a vital oppor-
tunity to foster the struggle of many priests. However, this attempt
was not sufficient to attain their ultimate goals. For instance, the
civil servants of the Porte questioned those priests who were caught
with weapons in Bosnia in order to provoke and mobilise local
Christians for a new resistance. During the inquiry of civil servants,
it was revealed that there was an implicit cooperation between the
priests and the Austrian political elites. However, the Porte did not
attempt to take a serious measure when the priests declared that
they were in preparation to return to the Austrian Empire perma-
nently. Nonetheless, the capacity of the Porte was limited to punish
every resisting attempt and uprising for a short period of time. Thus,
a serious verbal notification not to cross the Ottoman boarder was
found sufficient to terminate the inquiry of the incident attempted
by those priests.31
The outlaws and their political rebellions polarized religious divi-
sion between Muslim and Christian subjects in Bosnia and unveiled
the socio-cultural vulnerability in the region. The Ottoman Empire
dully accepted many of the concerns of the Christian subjects in
terms of religious practice with the Edict of 1856. The Christian
subjects asked for respect and a complete tolerance to their religious
symbols and rituals when they negotiated to put an end to those
riots. After rebellious attempts in different parts of Bosnia –including
Tuzla, Kladina and Bihać32- during the 1850s, the Porte recognised
the requests of rebels. These symbolic requests comprised significant
changes in terms of religious freedom and public regulations. These
rights allowed the Christians in Bosnia to chime the church bells
and organize their own ceremonies. What is more, they were able to
elect their own local leaders to practise administrative duties such
as tax collection. Accordingly, the land ownership right was recog-
nized for Christians.33
The Porte did not distinguish the ethnic or religious identity of the
outlaws when reacting to them as long as its authority was not
threatened by those outlaws, secret committees, rebels or bandits.
For instance, Hasan Ali and his two brothers from the village of Avcı
Hasan, which means Hasan the hunter literally, were arrested in the
mosque of their village while receiving religious training. After the
investigations, it was found that they terrorised the region of
Shumen, located in the north-eastern part of Bulgaria today.34
The document issued on December 3, 1860 ordered for the arrest
of Priest Pereto because of his cooperation with outlaws in Serbia to
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encourage Christian subjects in order to resist against the Ottoman
authority.35 Priest Pereto was not alone in his mission. Similarly,
Priest Shenkiltorusye played an important role by cooperating with
the rebels and bandits. However, he was deported to Bursa′, the
former capital city of the Ottoman Empire in North-western Anatolia,
after it was found that he supported and encouraged resistance in
his hometown Bihać, a town in North-eastern Bosnia and
Herzegovina today. His arrest did not stop him to realise his ideals.
He achieved to escape from Bursa to Serbia and started exporting
guns and some gunpowder from Serbian towns to the resisting
places in the inner Ottoman lands. Upon his second arrest, the Porte
decided to exile him and his family to a remote place.36 The next year
Metropolitan bishop and six other high ranked commanders in
Maleş, a town in Skopje, were blamed by local governors for hiding
Eplo who was a notorious outlaw from Niš.37 The activist priests in
the uprising movement brought devastating political divisions with
a sociocultural character in the places populated by the Christians.
The Porte was informed that Priest Joseph from the village of Yanya
in Prijepolje aimed at provoking peasants in the village in order to
resist against the Ottoman rule. The Porte immediately declared
the Priest Joseph a şaki, an outlaw, who organised attacks with the
band of Višegrad. Hence, the verdict announced to punish Priest
Joseph and his supporters who were framed as outlaws by the Porte
as they strove to expand the political unrest in the region.38
The religious support did not only increase motivation of outlaws
but also created new conflicts between the religious authorities of
the Christian and Muslim governors. One of the most prominent
examples of this conflict occurred in the Sanjak of Chania, which
was the most important region in the Vilayet of Crete. The island
had already become a notorious place for the Empire with its upris-
ing attempts starting from the early 1820s. The resistance was re-
pressed with bloody spasm attacks of the Ottomans. The pashas of
Crete were appointed to Chania to control the island easily from this
strategically located town. The priests were again in the stage as the
leading figures to liberate the Greek populated regions from the
Ottoman rule and to make them a part of the newly established
Greek state. The two priests, Gomno and Partino of the Chania
Gayniye Monastery, which was in close proximity to Chania, drew a
furious attention of Mustafa Naili Pasha who had been in the island
for more than three decades and suppressed previous Greek upris-
ings successfully as much as he did these suppressions violently.
He blamed Gomno and Partino for harbouring the resisting rebels
of the different bandit groups and encouraging those rebels vigor-
ously. The official correspondence of Mustafa Nail Pasha to Istanbul
uttered serious threats that were posed by the priests to the safety
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and authority of the Ottoman rule in the island. Hence, he recom-
mended the arrestment and punishment of these priests in their
visits to Istanbul.39 It is debatable whether the priests were punished
in line with Mustafa Naili Pasha’s request because the Ottoman
governing elites in Istanbul were quite sensitive about giving final
decisions regarding Crete whose Greek populated subjects′ dissents
took attention by the Great powers starting from the 1820s.
However, Mustafa Naili Pasha was called to Istanbul and promoted
to Grand Vizier after three years of this incident. The Porte decided
to increase the number of the soldiers in Crete when the revolts
erupted again in the island in 1866. The outlaws were again the
principal actors in leading the political tumult and agitating the
Greek community in Crete. Taking the support for the independence
of Crete at the international level was an important policy for the
organizers of resistance so much so that the support of Pope in
Vatican was sought as well. The Porte was much aware of the anti-
Ottomanist sentiments in the island that’s why it decided to increase
the military preparations and logistic support of the Ottoman army
in the island after the majority of the troops left from Crete to the
Khedivate of Egypt in 1867.40
On the other hand, it is hard to define the relationship between the
Ottoman rule and ecclesiastic class as a constant, untransformed
and hostile aggression during this period. There were numerous
clerics and priests who cooperated harmoniously with the Porte in
the prevention of outlaws and nationalist movements. Ziso was one
of them who was a cleric from Almyros,41 a town in the region of
Thesally. He worked for the Empire and was responsible for the
secretarial duties during the struggle of the Greek state that aimed
to increase its territories by carving up the dissolving Ottoman
Empire. The nationalist bandit groups uttered threats towards Ziso.
The outcome of those threats was dramatic; the outlaws set on fire
his house. However, the Porte did not leave him alone and helpless.
The issued decree on October 1, 1858 aimed to compensate his
damage by giving him two thousand kurush.42 The use of violence
was a strategic and sometimes a necessary decision in the course
of political conflict. The identity-oriented uprisings demonstrated a
political character and created the zones of political fragility with
the contribution of outlaws and state force into this vehement ambi-
ance of political violence.
Arendt’s approach to violence is novel in terms of giving new mean-
ings to the old concepts. However, her perspective is state-centred,
which limits violence within the orbit of revolutions, state violence
and political legitimacy. According to this perspective, violence takes
its central position when the legitimacy of the power-holders is defied
seriously. As a result, violence prevails as an expected outcome of the
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decaying political legitimacy when we consider that “all political
institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they
petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to
uphold them.”43 The social and political circumstances of a local
setting can be determinative to understand the multifaceted
relationship between violence and power. Additionally, there was a
dialogic relation between the emerging nations, their supporters
and the “Others”44 as it happened in the nationalist movements of
nineteenth century Ottoman political stratum. The increasing gap
between the politically oriented outlaws and the Ottoman state
authority signified the principal struggle of state formation in which
an imagined and “civilised”45 habitus could have been attained
according to the perspective of outlaws. The huge network of
bureaucracy within the state power is greater in number than the
instruments of violence.46 However, the outcome of violence can
bring a definite failure to the complex and grandiose structures of
state power as the zones of political fragility demonstrated in this
section. The zones of political fragility, therefore, were the public
places of prevailing political violence. Nevertheless, the everyday life
was also shaped tragically by the attributions of non-political
violence in the zones of social fragility, which will be explored in the
next section.
The Zones of Social Fragility in the Prevalence of Non-Political
Violence
The political violence examined in the previous section was perceived
as a severe threat by the ruling political authority. On the other
hand, the non-political character of violence has also an influence
on the production of malevolent power. These dynamics of power
resonated more vehemently in the public space where the Ottoman
Empire was not able to protect the civilian people against the attacks
of outlaws. These public places, therefore, were the zones of social
fragility with the creation of a volatile social life and the increase of
victims in each attack. The most important distinction between a
violent outlaw group and a responsible state authority lies in the
protection of rights, goods and lives of the people. The prestige of
state authority, in other words the prestige of state power, surges
with the prevention of public violence and guaranteeing public
safety. The Ottoman Empire employed violence from time to time
and defied its own power either through irresponsible soldiers,
corrupt local officials or over-reactionary irregular soldiers. Yet there
were also responsible and decisive governors and pashas who
endeavoured to restore public safety and protect the vulnerable
people. Derviş Pasha was one of them. The community of Zupče, a
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town in Kosovo, attempted to revolt against the Ottoman rule in
1861. Derviş Pasha was appointed to lead the army to suppress the
resistance. An order was declared for the soldiers who were sent to
the town to suppress the uprising under his rule. The letter explicitly
stated that “any attack against the churches, houses and assets of
people as well as their lives are against the honour of a soldier and
such a behaviour is against the values of humanity…Violation of this
order is such a disgrace and the ones who even practice these
prohibited acts will be punished severely.”47
The most serious attacks of outlaws demonstrated radical aspira-
tions of non-political violence in the zones of social fragility. The
mutinous attacks were not limited to the reactions of local people
as it happened in the case of Nevâhî-i Âsîyye noted above. Addition-
ally, diverse bandit groups crossed the borders between the two
confronting territories: The one that was directly controlled by the
Ottoman governors and the other that was under the administration
of Serbian or Montenegrin rulers. The risk of death or being a victim
of public unsafety was not improbable in the daily lives of people re-
siding in the border villages and towns between Serbia, Montenegro
and the inner lands that were directly controlled by the Porte. The
outlaws moved between the border regions with ease to commit
crime with the aim of typical brigandage activities such as plunder-
ing, theft, and extortion. These outlaws committed the ordinary
crime of which violence constituted an important outcome of these
attacks. The crimes against the civilian people in the borders
rendered chasing of outlaws more challenging for the Porte.
The criminal activities reached an unbearable level in the 1870s.
Mehmed Ali Pasha, head of the navy squadron of the Sanjak of Novi
Pazar telegraphed Istanbul about the incidents of outlaws. The
discourse used in the telegraph demonstrated the horrendous and
challenging threat posed by the outlaws to the social order of every-
day life. He stated that the local bandit groups from Sjenica, Nova
Varoš (Yenivaroş) and the other outlaws from Serbia torched the
houses of two peasants around at 5:00 a.m in the morning and then
fled to Serbia along with other outlaws from Lobova village in 1875.48
Following this event, two persons, Camcının Suleyman and Sebalar
Sherif from Visegrád, were assassinated in 1876 by the Serbian
outlaws. After their assassinations, the bands crossed the Ottoman
border again and returned to Serbia.49 The peasants were victimised
in these attacks when the Porte had certain administrative and
geographical limits to protect the safety of its boarders. The next
year, three brothers Zeynel, Selman and Suleyman and their
neighbours Shakir and Reshid were added to the new victim list
when they went far away from their villages and reached close to
Sjenica to graze their cattle. They became the targets of around thirty
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outlaws from Serbia. Zeynel was dead by the rifle bullets. They would
have been fortunate if they were found by the security forces because
Sjenica was a border town and there was a station of Serbia in which
the police force resided and patrolled in the region regularly. How-
ever, Mehmed Ali Pasha reported to the Porte that Serbian zaptiehs
saw the event, but they neither prevented the attacks of outlaws
against the unarmed peasants nor attempted to chase them immedi-
ately after the incident happened.50
The vulnerability of peasants impelled them not to go even to the
forests to fulfil their wood needs as the ill fame of outlaws and their
attacks spread throughout each village. The traditional hideouts of
outlaws were the mountains and forests as these unnoticeable
places provided safe shelters for them. The letter, which was sent to
the Tuna province, expressed that the increasing number of deaths
in the boarder settlements would lead a more serious and ungovern-
able social clashes in the region.51 The concerns of the Porte became
more discernible when Ibrahim’s body was found in the forest close
to his home in Rizperebez village. He was killed by the Serbian
outlaws.52 Yet the Serbian authorities′ disinterest in the prevention
of banditry activities, which were ordinary crimes at the same time,
sent the Porte into a state of hopelessness about the protection of
peasants in the border towns and reestablishment of its already-
damaged authority in the periphery.
The religious identities of victims were not important to the of-
fenders. The Serbian outlaws who crossed into the Ottoman Empire
from the Principality of Serbia could target the Serbian peasants in
the boarder villages and towns. Brichte Todosve, who was from
Rotosh, Nova Varoš (Yenivaroş), was one of these peasants. He was
first beaten and then his thirthy-six goats were taken by the outlaws
and brought to Serbia in 1874. Brichte was not the only victim in
these banditry activities; his neighbours, Baiik and Ispeeyo were also
targets of the same bandit group whose eight horses and nine bulls
were stolen.53 Christian subjects were suffered from similar banditry
activities in 1875 and this time the Serbian bandits raid the house of
Vasilya from Macik village of Nova Varoš (Yenivaroş) in the early
morning. He was beaten seriously and his wife was sent to death
by the bullets of outlaws who seized a big portion of the goods, cattle
and money of other residents in the village. Around three hundredth
bandits in Nova Varoš entered numerous villages in that year and
had a low intense small war with the military forces of the Ottoman
Empire. The roads, which were blocked by the Serbian outlaws, were
opened and security in the region was restored by the Ottoman rule
with a high cost; however, a few Serbian outlaws lost their lives in the
armed conflicts between the Serbian outlaws and Ottoman forces.
The others managed to flee.54
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The outlaws created unsafe conditions not only for the Muslim
communities, but also for the holy places of Christians like Athos,55
which has been the home of prominent churches and monasteries
since the early Christianity. Its holy status sustained when Salonika
was captured by Murad II in 1430. On the other hand, the holy
status of Athos, at least its cultural significance, did not discourage
certain outlaws to attack the houses and monasteries in the
mid-1850s. This part of the eastern Greece was a mountainous
region and the scope of mobility was seriously challenging, if not
impossible. This small and formidable rocky territory was not too
far from urban places, considering that its eighty-mile distance from
Salonika. The safety of religious communities in Athos was under
profound risks so much so that Kesaryos, the monk of Filotios
Monastery, had to flee from Athos like many other monks because
of prevalent violence in the region. Nevertheless, the repression of
outlaws and their elimination gave Kesaryos the required permission
to return to his monastery in 1856.56 After four years of Kesaryos′
return, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church declared a document
accusing the Porte by claiming that the Ottoman officials in the rural
areas were not acted responsibly and their disinterest in the preven-
tion of banditry activities made them liable in the expansion of
outlaws in Serres, which was fifty-mile away from Salonika and
hosted a considerable number of Orthodox Christians at that time.57
After five years of incidents in Serres, this time a similar attack of
outlaws into the Sanjak of Ohri enforced the Patriarch to take the
same initiative by requesting the investigation of these attacks seri-
ously as Christian subjects were the prominent groups who suffered
desperately due to these attacks.58
Arendt’s indications about violence mostly revolve around the
power of governments, but she did not delve into the complex
dynamics that set the violence of non-state forces through targeting
both the local community and the state authority. Indeed, this form
of violence created the zones of social fragility when the bandits,
brigands and other forms of outlaws were delegitimized both by the
state authority and the local community. The outlaws examined in
this section dominated the public sphere through the ravages of
violence. In so doing, they created great concerns both in the central
state authority and the periphery where the local people were
victimized by their attacks.
Conclusive Remarks: The Inclusiveness of Violence in the Zones
of Fragility
The identity-oriented uprisings against the state power sparked
political violence and constituted the principal motives of public
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tension between the outlaws and the Ottoman state authority. These
violent tensions were transformed into contested actions in the
public spaces and created the zones of political fragility. Each politi-
cal violence in the public space prevailed the socio-political ambiance
of uncertainty particularly after the second half of the nineteenth
century. Hence, violence played a strategic role in the surge of politi-
cal conflict between the outlaws and the state authority. Thereof, the
political conflict widened the scope of fragility within the political
realm while challenging the state power at the same tıme. Yet the
political violence in the zones of political fragility constituted only
one part of this dramatic social life in the periphery. The other part
was more perilous for the residents of that particular zone where
the incidents occurred because the non-political violence grounded
in an atmosphere of social fragility by targeting the civilians. The
outlaws victimised the innocent people without considering their
religious or ethnic identity. As a result, the Christians, Muslims
and Jews were targeted by the outlaws in the Ottoman Balkans. This
is the reason that the violence and conflicts were not the outcome of
solely nationalist or religious dissent. In doing so, the non-political
violence transformed the conditions of everyday life into the
‘precarity’ of vulnerable people. This violent transformation, there-
fore, created the zones of social fragility in the public places where
the non-political violence was rife. Thus, the relationship between
violence –whether political violence or non-political violence- and
power became an important part of decadence in public safety.
Violence aggravated the risks to guarantee public order and chal-
lenged the state sovereignty when the outlaws aimed at functioning
as the most horrendous authority in the zones of fragility.
The zones of fragility demonstrated the impotence of state power to
protect the safety of public domains under its rule. The absence of
power creates a fertile social atmosphere to rule the public through
violence by other non-state forces. Arendt puts forth that “power
and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other
is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its
own course its end is the disappearance of power. Violence can
destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.”59 The presented
cases about the outlaws in the zones of social fragility confirm the
argument of Arendt about power and violence. Violence in the zones
of social fragility rendered the Ottoman state power weak and inca-
pable. However, the public spaces in the zones of political fragility
also severely remained under the perishing influence of violence. As
a result, both political and non-political violence shaped the state
power and determined its reaction in the cases presented above. This
is the reason that the form of violence loses its significance when the
violence itself in the public space functions as the most determining
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factor over the future of society and the state. This landmark and
deleterious influence of violence has an inclusive character consider-
ing its capacity when the issue is widening or narrowing the orbit of
power. Even though the main hypothesis of Arendt is tested in this
study, it bears emphasis that the arguments of Arendt are mostly
based on the role of violence in the political sphere with the rise of
totalitarian governance and glorified national sentiments of the state
cadre.60 Conversely, the Ottoman Empire implemented a number of
reforms and imposed cosmopolitan Ottoman identity against the rise
of nationalist sentiments among different communities in the nine-
teenth century. From this perspective, the future studies may fill
an important gap if the arguments of Arendt are used for compara-
tive case studies of different empires in the age of nationalism.
This study is limited to the role of outlaws in the Ottoman Empire
in the nineteenth century. I endeavoured to explore the relationship
between violence and power. This study agrees with the main argu-
ment about the pernicious force of violence in the realms of power.
However, it negates that the form of violence -whether political or
non-political- has a distinctive influence when both public safety
and state sovereignty are under the great risks of violence. Thereof,
either the political or non-political violence may produce similar
threats against the ruling power in the zones of fragility. The histori-
cal sociology is at the crossroads of history and sociology so it has a
significant responsibility both to be innovative in its approach to
the historical subject and to ask hard questions about the validity
of social theories. This article offers only a small contribution to
understand the longing and challenging relationship between
violence and power through focusing the role of outlaws in the
Ottoman Empire. Yet the historical sociology can benefit greatly by
the future studies that delve into the mysterious and factual cases
in the archives of different social and cultural geographies to
conceive the relationship between violence and power, centre and
periphery, state and society, and finally public space and the zones
of fragility.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the British Academy.
Endnotes
1 The Sublime Porte, Bâb-ı Âli in origin, is a metonym, which was used by
the Ottoman state and European governments to signify the Ottoman
central government in Istanbul.
2 Eric J. Hobsbawm. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social
Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (Manchester:
The Zones of Fragility 19
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. •• No. •• •• 2016
Manchester University Press, 1959). See also Eric J. Hobsbawm, Bandits.
(New York: The New Press, [1969], 2000). The banditry studies also dealt
with certain issues through a socio-economic perspective. For example see
Thomas Gallant, “Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State Formation:
Transnational Crime from a Historical World-Systems Perspective”, in J.
Mc C. Heyman, States and Illegal Practices (Oxford and New York: Oxford
Berg, 1999), p. 25-61. The social banditry concept was challanged in relation
to the need of approaching bandits as a complex social and economic
outcome rather than a romatic uprising attempt. See Paul Sant Cassia.
Banditry, Myth and Terror in Cyprus and other Mediterranean Societies.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 35(1993): 773-795. For another
realist banditry explanation see John S. Koliopoulos. Brigands with a Cause:
Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987).
3 JohnS. Koliopoulos. Brigandage and Irredentism inNineteenth-century
Greece.EuropeanHistory Quarterly, 19(1989), pp. 195.
4 John S. Koliopoulos. Brigands with a Cause, 1987.
5 Aleksander Petrović. The Role of Banditry in the Creation of Nation
States in the Central Balkans during the 19th Century. MA thesis, Simon
Fraser University, 2003.
6 Karen Barkey. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State
Centralization. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). See Chapter I.
7 Carter Vaughn Findley. Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The
Sublime Porte, 1789-1922. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.
140. See also Avigdor Levy. “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of
Sultan Mahmud II,” Asian and African Studies 7(1971): 13-39. See Stanford
J. Shaw. “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue
System,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6(1975): 421-459.
8 The Edict of 1856 in the era of Abdulmecid I was a progressive
document based on the equality principle to create Ottomanism as an
umbrella and inclusive term so much so that vatandaş, fellow-citizen, was
used first-time in the Edict whıle referrıng to the Ottoman subjects. The
fundamental rights of the non-Muslims were recognised and the Edict also
enforced the conscription of non-Muslims into the army. From this point of
view, it minimised, at least in principle, the social and legal differences
among different religious communities to strengthen the cultural fabrics of
Ottomanism. For a more systematic evaluation of the Tanzimat era, see
Kemal Karpat. The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908.
International Journal of Middle East Studies 3(1972): 237-274.
9 Donald Quataert. The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 66.
10 Köksal’s work deftly shows that the weak local networks at the
community level were failed to implement the Tanzimat reforms in line with
state centralisation. On the other hand, the dense communal networks
among the ethnic and religious communities created new barriers in state
centralisation and Ottomanism. See Yonca Köksal. “Rethinking Nationalism.
State Projects and Community Networks in 19th-Century Ottoman Empire,”
American Behavioral Scientist 51(2008): 1498-1515. See also Reşad Kasaba,
The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy. The Nineteenth Century. (Al-
bany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 67.
11 Halil Inalcık. Tanzimâtın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri. Belleten 28
(1964): 623-690. See also Mark Pinson. Ottoman Bulgaria in the First
Tanzimat Period – The Revolts in Niš (1841) and Vidin (1850). Middle Eastern
Baris Cayli20
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. •• No. •• •• 2016
Studies 11(1975): 103-146. See Ahmet Uzun. Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler.
Niş Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme (1841). (Istanbul: Eren, 2002).
12 Maria Nikolaeva Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), see Chapter IV.
13 Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. The
New York Review of Books, 12 (4), February 27, 1969. After this article in
New York Times, Hannah Arendt published a book the next deepening her
theoretical intervention on violence. See Hannah Arendt. On Violence.
(Orlando, Austin, New York, San Diego, London: Harvest Books, 1970).
14 Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.
15 Richard Bernstein also takes attention to the personal experiences of
Hannah Arendt as she explained that thinking efforts are the reflections of
personal experiences. Considering the biography of Hannah Arendt, it is
not surprising to conceive that why violence had a central place in her writ-
ings and had a solid connection with the political realm. See Richard J.
Bernstein. Violence. Thinking without Banisters. (London: Polity Press, 2013).
16 Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.
17 Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, Richard Tilly. The Rebellious Century 1830–
1930. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons), 1975, p. 286.
18 Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.
19 Charles Tilly. The Politics of Collective Violence. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 2001, p. 4.
20 Paschalis M. Kitromilides. ‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of
National Question in the Balkans. European History Quarterly 19(1989):
149-194.
21 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 121/1, 1 R.Evvel 1269 – 13 December 1852. See also
A.MKT.UM. 120/9, 24 R.Ahir 1269 – 4 February 1853,
22 BOA. A.AMD., 41/44, 9 Rebiülevvel 1269 - 21 December 1852.
23 Mutasarrif was an administrative authority in a local region who was
appointed by the Sultan to deal with the governing issues of the appointed
region.
24 BOA. I.HR., 89/4370, 5 Ramadan 1268 – 23 June 1852.
25 Zafer Gölen, “1852-53 Karadağ Askerî Harekâtı ve Sonuçları” History
Studies, V. 1/1 (2009), 220.
26 Gölen, 2009, 220.
27 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 528/62, 28 C.Evvel 1278 – 1 December 1861.
28 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 327/90, 25 Safer 1275 – 4 October 1858.
29 The police force.
30 BOA. MVL. 991/93, 4 Muharrem 1281 – 9 June 1864.
31 BOA. HR.MKT. 320/51, 7 C.Evvel 1276 – 2 December 1859.
32 Bihke is the official name of the city in the Ottoman Empire.
33 Gölen, 2009, pp. 127.
34 BOA. A.MKT.NZD. 210/54, 22 C.Ahir 1273 – 17 February 1857.
35 BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 123/79, 19 C.Evvel 1277 – 3 December 1860.
36 BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 146/88, 25 Zilkade 1278 – 24 May 1862.
37 BOA. BOA. A.MKT.UM. 505/67, 6 R.evvel 1278 – 11 September 1861.
38 BOA. TŞRBNM. 16/20, 10 Şevval 1280 – 19 March 1864; see also
TŞRBNM. 16/33, 12 Şevval 1280 – 21 March 1864.
39 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 130/11, 19 C.Evvel 1266 – 2 April 1850.
40 BOA. I.MTZ.GR. 34/1409, 17 C.rvvel 1284 – 16 September 1867.
41 Ermiye in Ottoman Turkish.
42 BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 111/17, 4 R.Evvel 1276 – 1 October 1859.
43 Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.
The Zones of Fragility 21
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. •• No. •• •• 2016
44 Rodanthi Tzinelli. Nation-Building and Identity in Europe. The Dialogics
of Reciprocity. (New York and London: Palgrave Millan, 2008). See particu-
larly Chapter 1 and 2 for the bandits and identity.
45 See the second volume of Norbert Elias. State Formation and Civiliza-
tion: The Second Volume of Civilizing Process. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
46 Arendt defends the argument that the huge organization of state
bureaucracy for social and political control can be influential. However, it
is also vulnerable in the face of the subversive power that entails with
violence. Malesevic also raised a similar argument, however he added that
this huge structural bureaucracy also coupled with “a potent of legitimizing
ideology”. See Sinisa Malesevic. The Sociology of War and Violence. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 4.
47 Ergili Ahmed Hilmi Ibni Resul, Osmanli-Karadah Muhaberati
Tarihcesi, varak:46a, cited in Gölen, 2009, pp. 127.
48 BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-146, 10 Safer 1292 – 18 March 1875.
49 BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-152, 19 Safer 1293 – 16 March 1876.
50 BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-146, 27 R.evvel 1293 – 22 April 1876.
51 BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-93, 9. R.evvel 1292 - 15 April 1875.
52 BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-93, 3 R.ahir 1293 – 29 April 1876.
53 BOA. HR. SYS. 250/1-221, 29 Ramadan 1291 – 9 November 1874.
54 BOA. HR.SYS. 250-1/96, 8 R.evvel 1292 – 14 April 1875.
55 Aynoros in Ottoman Turkish.
56 BOA. HR.MKT. 133/82, 14 C.ahir 1272 – 21 February 1856.
57 BOA. MVL. 911/30, 27 Receb 1276 – 19 February 1860 and MVL.
911/66, 19 Şaban 1276 - 12 March 1860.
58 BOA. MVL. 960/70, 29 Ramadan 1281 – 25 February 1865.
59 Hannah Arendt. On Violence. (Orlando, Florida: Harcourbooks, 1970),
pp. 56.
60 Hannah Arendt. On Revolution. (New York: Viking Press, 1963).
Baris Cayli22
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. •• No. •• •• 2016
